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CHILD WITNESS POLICY: LAW
INTERFACING WITH SOCIAL SCIENCE
DOROTHY F. MARSIL,* JEAN MONTOYA,** DAVID ROSS,***
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I
INTRODUCTION
The number of children testifying in court has posed serious practical and
legal problems for the judicial system.  One problem confronting the courts is
how to protect children from experiencing the psychological trauma resulting
from a face-to-face confrontation with a defendant who may have physically
harmed the child or threatened future harm to the child.  Another concern is
that this trauma may impair children’s memory performance and their willing-
ness to disclose the truth.  In response to these concerns, child witness innova-
tions proliferated throughout the United States in the 1980s and 1990s.1  Among
the innovations were: placing a screen between child witnesses and the defen-
dant during children’s testimony;2 transmitting children’s testimony into the
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1. Child witness innovations proliferated in other countries as well.  See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, Child
Witnesses in the Canadian Criminal Courts: Recognizing Their Capacities and Needs, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 323 (1999) (discussing the law in Canada); Helen L. Westcott et al., Children, Hearsay, and
the Courts: A Perspective from the United Kingdom, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 282 (1999) (discuss-
ing the law in England and Wales).
2. Using a screen to shield a child witness from the defendant is not as popular as the more high-
tech procedure of using closed-circuit television.  Statutes expressly providing for use of a screen to
shield a child witness from the defendant are uncommon.  See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (Michie 1998)
(providing for the use of one-way mirrors or closed-circuit television); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2163a(12) (West 2000) (providing for rearranging the courtroom and positioning the defendant “so
that the defendant is as far from the witness stand as is reasonable and not directly in front of the wit-
ness stand”).  But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g(a) (1994) (allowing the defendant to be “screened
from the sight and hearing of the child”).  Some cases, however, record instances of trial courts permit-
ting the use of a screen.  E.g., State v. Welch, 760 So. 2d 317, 319 n.1 (La. 2000) (defendant ordered to
sit behind clear glass wall nine to ten feet behind defense counsel’s table, where paper was taped to the
glass to block the child’s view of the defendant); State v. Murphy, 542 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (La. 1989) (de-
fendant present in the same room as the child witness during child’s testimony by closed-circuit televi-
sion, but defendant ordered to sit behind opaque screen that shielded him from child’s view); State v.
Davis, 830 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Mont. 1992) (defendant present in courtroom during children’s testimony,
but a “free-standing hinged space partition, apparently intended for use as a temporary room divider”
was placed between the witness stand and the counsel table where the defendant sat); State v. Thomas,
442 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Wis. 1989) (defendant present in the same room as child witness during the record-
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courtroom by closed-circuit television;3 and admitting children’s otherwise in-
admissible hearsay,4 including children’s videotaped interviews.5  These innova-
tions spawned a fair amount of appellate litigation regarding their constitution-
ality.  Much of the litigation focused on whether a given innovation violated the
Confrontation Clause,6 but questions about due process arose as well.
ing of child’s videotaped deposition, but screen was placed between defendant and child to block child’s
view of defendant).
3. E.g., 18 U.S.C. 3509 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (allowing two-way closed-circuit television); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.45.046 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4253 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-1001
(Michie 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413.5 (1999);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86g (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3514 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 92.54
(1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Harrison 1998) (allowing two-way closed-circuit television); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 626-616 (1993) (same); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024A (Michie 1997) (same); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/106B-5 (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (West 1998) (same); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:283 (West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 774 (1996 & Supp. 2000) (same); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West 1998) (subsequently held unconstitutional for violating the defen-
dant’s state constitutional right to a “face-to-face” meeting with witnesses under Commonwealth v.
Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West 2000); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West 1994); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
65.30 (McKinney 1992) (allowing two-way closed-circuit television); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481
(West Supp. 2000) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West 1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2
(1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-120 (Supp. 1999) (allowing two-way closed-circuit television); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (sec. 3) (West Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 2000) (allowing two-way closed-circuit television); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.150
(West 2000); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5; VT. R. EVID. 807 (allowing two-way closed-circuit television, but
permitting the court to proscribe transmitting the defendant’s image to the child witness).
4. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-25-31, 15-25-32, 15-25-37 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie
2000) (making child hearsay admissible before the grand jury); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360 (West Supp.
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (1995 &
Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (Harrison 1998)
(providing, in 1995 amendment, for the admissibility of child witness statements; held unconstitutional
in Woodard v. State, 496 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1998)); HAW. REV. STAT. § 804(b)(6) (1993); 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1994 & Supp. 1999); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 804(B)(5) (West 1995); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (1996 & Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 81 (West 2000);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 491-075 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51.385 (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. §
40.460(18b) (1988 & Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5985.1 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-16-38
(Michie 1995); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.072 (West Supp. 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
411 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 2000); ARK. R. EVID. 803(25), 804(b)(7);
MICH. R. EVID. 803A; N.J. R. EVID. 803(c)(27); N.D. R. EVID. 803(24); OHIO R. EVID. 807; VT. R.
EVID. 804a.
5. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3433 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:440.5 (West 1992); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 2000) (including video, audio, or other recorded statements as permissi-
ble testimony); MO. ANN. STAT. § 492.304 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-4.2 (West
1998); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. arts. 38.071(2) & (5) (West Supp. 1999); VA. CODE  ANN. § 63.1-
248.13:3 (Michie 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 908.08 (West 2000); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5.  But see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4252 (West 1989) (allowing videotaped testimony, but later held unconstitu-
tional for conflicting with the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority in State v. Taylor, 2 P.3d
674 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)).  For a critique of these statutes, see Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny
Happened on the Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
927, 940-50 (1993) (discussing the ineffectiveness of these statutes in protecting either the fact-finding
process or the child witness from interviewing abuses).
6. The Confrontation Clause provides that in “criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  It was apparently
included in the Bill of Rights without debate.  See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175-76 (1970)
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Court decisions regarding the constitutionality of child witness innovations
rest on a number of assumptions that are subject to empirical testing.  This arti-
cle examines many of these assumptions and evaluates whether they are sup-
ported by social science evidence.
Part II of the article examines the use of shielding procedures in child sexual
abuse prosecutions.  It begins by exploring the Supreme Court’s analysis of
state laws providing protection by shielding the child witness from the defen-
dant.  Next, it explores various questions: Do child witnesses need protection
from confrontational stress?  Does shielding prejudice the defendant?  Does it
impact juror perception of the proceedings’ fairness?  Does shielding impact ju-
ror perception of the child witness?  How reliable is children’s shielded testi-
mony?  Does shielding impair juror ability to detect deception in the child wit-
ness?
Part III examines the use of hearsay testimony in child sexual abuse prose-
cutions.  As with Part II, it begins by painting a picture of the legal landscape.
Specifically, it considers the evidentiary and constitutional implications of using
hearsay when children are witnesses.  Part III then addresses various questions:
Does admitting hearsay testimony protect the child witness?  Does admitting
hearsay testimony prejudice the defendant?  How reliable is hearsay testimony
offered in trials involving child witnesses?  How accurate are the hearsay wit-
nesses?  Are they able to reconstruct details of their out-of-court exchange with
the child witness?  Does the eyewitness report deteriorate as it is transmitted
down the hearsay chain from the child to the hearsay witness?
Part IV concludes the article.  It highlights the insights gained from the in-
terface of law and social science and makes suggestions for legal practice and
future social science research.
II
CHILDREN’S SHIELDED TESTIMONY
Using shielding procedures is distinct from admitting hearsay statements.
With shielding procedures, the child’s view of the defendant is obstructed dur-
ing the child’s testimony at trial.  When a screen is used, the child testifies from
behind a screen placed between the child and the defendant.  When one-way
closed-circuit television is used, the child testifies from a separate testimonial
room, and the child’s testimony is transmitted into the courtroom where the de-
fendant, jury, and judge are able to view the testimony.7  In either case, the child
witness testifies under oath and is subject to cross-examination.  In contrast,
when hearsay is admitted in lieu of the child’s testimony, not only does the child
avoid physical confrontation with the defendant, but the child witness is also not
(Harlan, J., concurring).  The Confrontation Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
7. When two-way, as opposed to one-way, closed-circuit television is used, the defendant’s image
is also transmitted to the location where the child is testifying.
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subject to cross-examination, because the prosecution relies on the testimony of
a hearsay witness who reports the child’s out-of-court statements.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of children’s
shielded testimony at trial in Coy v. Iowa.8  In Coy, the Court considered an
Iowa statute that allowed children to testify from behind a screen blocking their
view of the defendant.9  The trial court permitted a large screen to be placed be-
tween the defendant and the witness stand during the testimony of the child vic-
tims.10  Coy held that the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation was
violated by use of the screen.11  The opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia, de-
scribed the “irreducible literal meaning” of the Confrontation Clause as the
“‘right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.’”12  In
seeming contradiction, the Court stated in dicta that any exceptions to the “ir-
reducible literal meaning” of the Confrontation Clause “would surely be al-
lowed only when necessary to further an important public policy.”13  The State
argued that it had established necessity because the Iowa statute implied a leg-
islative finding that child witnesses suffer trauma from testifying in their assail-
ant’s presence.14  The Court rejected this argument and indicated that showing
necessity requires “individualized findings that . . . particular witnesses needed
special protection.”15  Such specific findings had not been made in Coy.
In Maryland v. Craig,16 this individualized showing of trauma was found by
the trial court.17  Craig involved a Maryland statute that allowed children to tes-
tify by one-way closed-circuit television if the judge first found that the child
would suffer “serious emotional distress such that the child [could not] reasona-
bly communicate” at trial.18  After receiving expert testimony,19 the trial court
made the requisite findings and allowed the children to testify using the one-
way closed-circuit television procedure.20  The children thereafter testified in a
separate room in the presence of counsel but outside the presence of the judge,
jury, and defendant, all of whom remained in the courtroom where a television
8. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).  Although physical confrontation was distinctly at issue in the earlier case
of Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), the Court sidestepped the issue there because physical con-
frontation was denied only for purposes of the children’s competency hearing and was otherwise en-
joyed during the trial.  Id. at 740-44.
9. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1987)).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1022.
12. Id. at 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))
(emphasis in original).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
17. Id. at 842.
18. Id. at 841 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)).
19. For a discussion of expert witness testimony and the necessity to shield a particular child wit-
ness, see Jean Montoya, Lessons from Akiki and Michaels on Shielding Child Witnesses, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 340, 342-43, 356-66 (1995) (arguing that trial court reliance on the testimony of the
child’s therapist is misplaced and that trial courts should personally examine the child witness).
20. Craig, 497 U.S. at 842-43.
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displayed the children’s testimony.21  As in Coy, the child witnesses could not
see the defendant while they testified.22  Unlike Coy, however, the child wit-
nesses did not testify in the presence of the judge and jury.  The Craig Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland procedure inasmuch as it required
a showing of necessity to protect the particular child witness23 and, unlike the
Iowa procedure in Coy, did not rely on a “legislatively imposed presumption of
trauma.”24  Justice O’Connor, writing for a five-member majority, reasoned that
the defendant’s right to physical confrontation was not absolute.25  Her opinion
further asserted that the state’s interest in protecting child witnesses from the
trauma of testifying in a child abuse case was sufficiently important to outweigh
the right to a face-to-face meeting.26  Justice Scalia and others dissented on the
ground that the “text of the Sixth Amendment is clear” and requires face-to-
face confrontation.27
A. Child Witness Protection
Shielding procedures are primarily premised on the idea that psychological
trauma occurs when child witnesses testify in the defendant’s presence.  In Coy
v. Iowa,28 the dissent noted that a child’s fear and trauma of testifying in a con-
frontational setting had two “serious” identifiable consequences: “They may
cause psychological injury to the child, and they may so overwhelm the child as
to prevent the possibility of effective testimony, thereby undermining the truth-
finding function of the trial itself.”29  Later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme
Court recognized the “growing body of academic literature documenting the
psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in
court.”30  Indeed, the phenomenon of confrontational stress experienced by
children is amply supported by social science evidence.31
21. Id. at 841.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 855.
24. Id. at 845 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988)).  The Court’s holding resembles
that of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).  In Globe, the Court acknowl-
edged the state’s compelling interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from the further trauma
and embarrassment of testifying in open court, but held that a Massachusetts statute barring press and
public access to criminal sex-offense trials during the testimony of minor victims violated the First
Amendment because the statute mandated uniform closure rather than selective closure based on a
case-by-case determination of the particular child’s needs.  Id. at 607-08, 610-11 & n.27.
25. Craig, 497 U.S. at 844-50.
26. Id. at 853.
27. Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that placement of a screen between the defendant and child wit-
nesses violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights).
29. Id. at 1032 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
30. 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (holding that transmitting children’s testimony by closed-circuit televi-
sion did not violate the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights when the prosecution demonstrated a
need for shielding a particular child witness).
31. See generally Louise Dezwirek-Sas, Empowering Child Witnesses for Sexual Abuse Prosecution,
in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 194 (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds., 1992); Rhona H. Flin, Hearing and
Testing Children’s Evidence, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 289 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L.
Bottoms eds., 1993); Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child
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Research shows that most child witnesses primarily fear a face-to-face con-
frontation with the defendant.32  For example, Gail Goodman and her col-
leagues interviewed actual child witnesses and reported that confrontation with
the defendant was the most stressful part of having to testify.33  This evidence
was supported and extended by the findings of Louise Dezwirek-Sas, who
found that, in addition to fearing a confrontation with the defendant, child wit-
nesses feared being hurt by the defendant, testifying on the stand, crying during
testimony, being sent to jail, and failing to understand questions that were
asked of them.34
Requiring children to testify in the defendant’s presence has significant con-
sequences.  These consequences were identified by the Coy dissent, namely,
that children’s stress may produce inaccurate or incomplete testimony.35  Social
science strongly supports this concern.  In fact, research has shown that the high
level of stress and anxiety experienced by child witnesses can decrease chil-
dren’s ability and/or willingness to provide complete and accurate evidence.
For example, a study by Douglas Peters provides support for the negative
effects of confrontational stress on child witnesses’ ability to disclose the truth.36
In his study, half of the children individually observed a simulation of a man
stealing money.37  The children were then asked to identify the thief either from
a photo array or a live lineup including the perpetrator.38  The children who
viewed a photo array accurately identified the perpetrator seventy-five percent
of the time, with only eight percent of the children incorrectly responding that
the thief was not in the lineup.39  When the child was in the presence of the thief
viewing the live lineup, however, his or her willingness to identify the perpetra-
tor decreased.40  In fact, only thirty-three percent of the children viewing the live
lineup accurately identified the perpetrator, with fifty-eight percent of them in-
correctly claiming that the perpetrator was not in the lineup.41  These results
strongly indicate that children are less willing or able to accuse a person when
that person is present.
Kay Bussey and her colleagues also studied the impact of the defendant’s
presence on a child’s ability to provide accurate and complete testimony.42  In
Sexual Assault Victims, in 5 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 100 (1992).
32. Id.
33. Goodman et al., supra note 31, at 101.
34. Dezwirek-Sas, supra note 31, at 187.
35. 487 U.S. 1012, 1032 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Douglas P. Peters, The Influence of Stress and Arousal on the Child Witness, in THE
SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS 60, 75 (John Doris ed., 1991).
37. Id. at 68.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 69.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Kay Bussey et al., Lies and Secrets: Implications for Children’s Reporting of Sexual Abuse, in
CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 162 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993).
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this study, children ages three, five, and nine years old individually witnessed a
man, the perpetrator, break a valued glass.43  The children were then inter-
viewed about the event in the presence or absence of the perpetrator.  Younger
children—three- and five-year-olds—were significantly less likely than older
children to disclose the event, and even less likely in the presence of the perpe-
trator.44  Even though the nine-year-old participants were equally likely to dis-
close the event in the presence or absence of the perpetrator, they experienced
anxiety as a result of having to tell on the perpetrator in his presence.45  Thus,
the presence of the perpetrator resulted in young children being less willing to
give complete and accurate evidence.46  These children appear to be at a greater
risk of experiencing a high level of stress and anxiety as a result of confronting a
perpetrator than are older children.
The evidence makes clear that children who are required to confront the ac-
cused experience more stress than children who are not required to do so.  Be-
cause the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of the child
witness, it is important to consider employing protective measures for children
due to possible psychological trauma resulting from testifying in the defendant’s
presence.  Moreover, high levels of trauma can indeed impair children’s mem-
ory and willingness to disclose the truth.  Shielding the child witness from the
defendant, by allowing the child to testify in the courtroom from behind a
screen or by allowing the child’s testimony to be transmitted into the courtroom
by closed-circuit television, addresses the problem of children’s confrontational
stress.  The source of the child’s stress, the defendant, is simply removed from
the child’s presence.
B. Defendant Prejudice
In Coy v. Iowa,47 the child witnesses, two thirteen-year-old girls, testified in
the courtroom from behind a screen that shielded them from seeing the defen-
dant.48  The screen did not prevent the defendant from seeing the child wit-
nesses.49  Nor did the screen prevent the child witnesses from seeing and being
seen by the judge, counsel, and jury.50  The defendant argued that allowing the
children to testify from behind a screen violated his right to due process, be-
cause the procedure would make him appear guilty.51  The trial court rejected
the defendant’s claim, but instructed the jury to draw no inference of guilt from
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
48. Id. at 1014.
49. Id. at 1027 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  After certain lighting adjustments in the courtroom, the
defendant was able to “dimly” perceive the witnesses.  Id. at 1015.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1015.
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the screen.52  The Supreme Court did not reach the defendant’s due process
claim because it reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds.53
The dissent, however, assumed that the defendant would not be prejudiced by
the shielding device: “A screen is not the sort of trapping that generally is asso-
ciated with those who have been convicted.  It is therefore unlikely that the use
of the screen had a subconscious effect on the jury’s attitude toward [the defen-
dant].”54
Social science evidence supports the dissent’s position that shielding does
not prejudice the defendant.  Researchers have studied the impact of shielding
procedures on conviction rates.55  In these studies, testimony using various pro-
tective measures is compared to open-court testimony given by the alleged child
victim.56  This research is an important step in understanding how the presenta-
tion of children’s testimony may influence a jury.
First, a study by Janet Swim and colleagues (the “Swim study”) examined
the use of videotaped depositions versus live testimony by a child witness in
court.57  Mock jurors watched a videotape of a simulated child sexual abuse trial
and completed pre- and post-deliberation questionnaires.  They deliberated on
charges of criminal sexual assault in the first degree, attempted criminal sexual
assault in the first degree, and criminal sexual assault in the second degree.58
The modality of the child’s testimony impacted pre-deliberation verdicts with
the results showing that the defendant was less likely to be found guilty on the
charge of criminal sexual assault in the first degree when the videotaped deposi-
tions were used than when the child testified in open court.59  The study found
no difference between trial conditions on the other charges.60  The finding sug-
gests that when the charge is more serious, the jurors would rather hear from
the child in open court before rendering a guilty verdict.  Accordingly, any dif-
ference found in pre deliberation verdicts actually favored the defendant.61  No
difference, however, in post-deliberation verdicts was found based on trial con-
dition.62
A study by David Ross and colleagues (the “Ross study”) supported and ex-
tended these findings.  In the Ross study, the trial stimulus was based on the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1022.
54. Id. at 1035 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology
on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 190-91
(1998); David F. Ross et al., The Impact of Protective Shields and Videotape Testimony on Conviction
Rates in a Simulated Trial of Child Sexual Abuse, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 554 (1994); Janet K.
Swim et al., Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony: Does Protecting the Child Witness Jeop-
ardize Due Process?, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 606 (1993).
56. Id.
57. Swim et al., supra note 55, at 606.
58. Id. at 607-08.
59. Id. at 620.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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transcript of an actual child sexual abuse case involving a ten-year-old victim.63
Mock jurors watched one of three videotaped trials that varied as to whether
the child testified in open court confronting the defendant, in court with a pro-
tective shield, or via closed-circuit television.64  In the first experiment, mock ju-
rors watched the entire trial, including the testimony of the child and other wit-
nesses, and then rendered a verdict.65  The results showed that the verdict was
not influenced by whether the child testified in open court, with a protective
shield, or via closed-circuit television.66  In the second experiment, mock jurors
watched the same trial except that the child was the first and only witness to tes-
tify.67  These mock jurors were more likely to find the defendant guilty when the
child testified in open court than when the child testified from behind a protec-
tive shield or via closed-circuit television.68  Thus, the presentation of the child’s
testimony made a difference when it was the only evidence presented: Shielding
reduced the likelihood of conviction.
Finally, in a study by Gail Goodman and her colleagues (the “Goodman
study”), children from two age groups—five- to six and eight- to nine years
old—were videotaped while individually interacting with a male confederate.69
In the guilty condition, the male asked the child to place stickers on exposed
body parts, such as their toes, arms, and belly button.70  In the not-guilty condi-
tion, the male asked the child to place stickers on items of clothing, such as their
shoe, shirt sleeve, or belt.71  After a two-week delay, mock jurors participated in
a simulated trial in which a child testified about the event in either open court
confronting the defendant or by closed-circuit television.72  The male confeder-
ate was charged with videotaping a child displaying exposed body parts.73  Re-
sults showed that the trial condition did not impact the conviction rate.74
These studies suggest that mock jurors are not biased against the defendant
when shielding procedures are employed.  Moreover, protective devices do not
appear to imply guilt.  Not only do protective devices not increase convictions
rates, they sometimes reduce them.
C. Perception of Fairness
In Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court acknowledged “[t]he perception that
confrontation is essential to fairness.”75  Similarly, in Maryland v. Craig, the
63. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 553.
64. Id. at 556-57.
65. Id. at 558.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 561.
68. Id. at 563.
69. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 176-77.
70. Id. at 177.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 178.
73. Id. at 177.
74. Id. at 198.
75. 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
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Court recognized the “strong symbolic purpose served by requiring adverse
witnesses at trial to testify in the accused’s presence.”76  Craig concluded that
the symbolic purpose of the Confrontation Clause was not impinged when
shielding procedures were used.77  Nevertheless, if jurors viewed shielding pro-
cedures as unfair to the defendant, the prosecution’s case could be prejudiced.
Social science research has documented jurors’ perception of trial fairness
when shielding procedures are used.  For example, Rod Lindsay, David Ross,
and their colleagues showed mock jurors a videotaped re-creation of a child
sexual abuse trial where the child’s testimony was presented either in open
court, from behind a protective shield, or via closed-circuit television.78  In cer-
tain instances, the judge warned jurors that the use of the shield or closed-
circuit television should not be used as evidence of the defendant’s guilt; in oth-
ers, the judge did not.79  In addition, the participants were asked to place them-
selves in the role of either a juror, a sibling of the defendant, or a sibling of the
victim’s mother.80  The results indicated that the use of the protective devices
did not impact jurors’ perceptions of the fairness of the trial.81  The judge’s in-
structions did have an impact, however, in that mock jurors who received the
implied guilt warning were significantly more likely to agree that the use of the
protective procedures was fair compared with jurors who did not receive the
warning.82  Finally, the perspective of the participant had a significant impact on
perceived fairness.83  Participants who played the role of the defendant’s sibling
perceived the protective devices to be more biased and unfair than participants
who played the role of juror or sibling of the victim’s mother.84
These results are consistent with findings from other studies.  The same re-
sults were found in the Ross85 and Swim86 studies that used a videotape of a
simulated child sexual abuse trial as the stimulus, as well as in the Goodman
study that used a highly realistic mock trial as its stimulus.87  In particular, juror
ratings of trial fairness were found not to differ whether the child testified using
a shield, by closed-circuit television, or in open court.  Thus, the evidence is
consistent across a number of different studies.  When protective measures are
used, the trial is generally perceived to be as fair as when a child testifies in
open court.  This is especially true when the judge provides a warning to the ju-
76. 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
77. Id. at 852.
78. Rod C.L. Lindsay et al., What’s Fair When a Child Testifies?, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
870, 873 (1995).
79. Id. at 874-75.
80. Id. at 875.
81. Id. at 878.
82. Id. at 883.
83. Id. at 878.
84. Id. at 879.
85. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 559 tbl. 2.
86. Swim et al., supra note 55, at 616.
87. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 191.
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rors not to allow the use of the shield or closed-circuit television to imply or
suggest that the defendant is guilty.
D. Child Witness Prejudice
In addition to being concerned with the jury’s perception of the trial’s fair-
ness in general, the prosecution is also concerned with the jury’s perception of
the child witness.  In Maryland v. Craig, the Court noted “the many subtle ef-
fects face-to-face confrontation may have on an adversary criminal proceed-
ing.”88  The Court was nevertheless satisfied that the presence of the other as-
pects of confrontation—oath, cross-examination, and observation of witness
demeanor, even if conducted by video monitor—rendered shielded testimony
the functional equivalent of live, in-person testimony.89
Prosecutors, however, bear the burden of proving their case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and “subtle effects” can make all the difference.  The testimony
of the child witness may be the centerpiece of the prosecutor’s case.  The prose-
cutor thus rightly questions whether shielded children’s testimony is the func-
tional equivalent of children’s live, in-person testimony for purposes of jury
perception of the child witness.
First, the Ross study also examined the use of protective shields and their
impact on mock jurors’ perceptions of child credibility.90  Results showed that
mock jurors rated the child’s credibility the same regardless of the testimony
condition.91
Similarly, the Swim study found that the medium of presentation did not
significantly impact jurors’ perceptions of the witnesses, including the child wit-
ness.92  Both of these studies, however, involved videotaped simulations of a
child sexual abuse trial.93  In other words, mock jurors in these studies were
never presented with a live child witness, but only with a videotape of a live
child witness.
Research using a live child witness has produced different results.  The
Goodman study examined mock jurors’ perceptions of the child witness’s credi-
bility.94  The results showed that while children gave more accurate testimony
when protective measures were used, mock jurors viewed the child witness as
less credible.95  This effect was somewhat mediated in that children who testified
more accurately were believed more credible by the mock jurors.96  In a related
88. 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990).
89. Id.
90. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 560.
91. Id.
92. Swim et al., supra note 55, at 617.
93. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 556; Swim et al., supra note 55, at 606.
94. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 195.
95. Id. at 196.
96. Id.
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study by Ann Tobey and her colleagues,97 jurors rated children who testified
using closed-circuit television as less believable, less accurate for both the
prosecution and the defense, less accurate in recalling the event, “more likely to
have made up the story, less able to testify based on fact . . . than fantasy, less
attractive, less intelligent, and less confident.”98  Interestingly, jurors also noted
that children testifying in the closed-circuit condition were less stressed than
children testifying in open court.99
A study by Graham Davies and Elizabeth Noon evaluated the “Livelink”
project, which involved the use of closed-circuit television for children’s testi-
mony in England and Wales.100  Among other topics, they explored the percep-
tion of a child’s credibility when he or she testifies via live link.101  Court profes-
sionals expressed concern that such testimony detracts from the impact of that
witness, including the perception of diminished emotion on the part of the vic-
tim, reduced eye contact with the jury, and a loss of rapport with the jury.102
This reduced impact could lead a jury to form negative perceptions of a child’s
credibility.
These studies support the view that the credibility of the child witness is not
enhanced, but suffers when protective procedures are used.103  Therefore, jurors
are likely to have a higher opinion of the child witness when the child appears in
person.104  Thus, the contrary findings of Ross et al. and Swim et al. may be at-
tributable to the experimental stimulus.105
E. Reliability of Shielded Testimony
In finding no violation of the Confrontation Clause, the Craig Court as-
sumed that children’s shielded testimony was “adequately” reliable.106  Even if
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure that the evidence against a
criminal defendant is reliable,107 evidentiary reliability is not a monolithic con-
cept.108  The Coy Court recognized this:
97. Ann E. Tobey et al., Balancing the Rights of Children and Defendants: Effects of Closed-Circuit
Television on Children’s Accuracy and Jurors’ Perceptions, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE
CHILD WITNESS 214 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995).
98. Id. at 232.
99. Id.
100. Graham Davies & Elizabeth Noon, Video Links: Their Impact on Child Witness Trials, in
CHILDREN, EVIDENCE, AND PROCEDURE 24 (Noel K. Clark & Geoffrey M. Stephenson eds., 1993).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 24-25.
103. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 196; Davies & Noon, supra note 100, at 24-25.
104. Id.
105. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 556; Swim et al., supra note 55, at 606.
106. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851 (1990).
107. Id. at 845.
108. The Court’s emphasis on the “truth-seeking goal” of the Confrontation Clause is problematic
and has engendered sharp criticism.  See Philip Halpern, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for
Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 165, 200 (1988-89) (“[T]he emphasis on reliability marks a
dangerous trend in criminal adjudication.  Unqualified truth concerning facts disputed in litigation can-
not consistently, if ever, be attained.”); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-To-Face Confron-
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The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of standing in the
presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very phenomenon it relies
upon to establish the potential “trauma” that allegedly justified the extraordinary pro-
cedure in the present case.  That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the
truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo
the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.109
What does it mean to say that children’s shielded testimony is “adequately”
reliable?  Is the appropriate standard the overall accuracy of children’s shielded
testimony?  Does adequate reliability mean that children’s shielded testimony is
at least as accurate as their unshielded courtroom testimony?  Or does perspec-
tive matter?  Is the appropriate standard the incidence of false accusations?
Does adequate reliability mean that children’s false accusations occur no more
frequently when children are shielded than when children are unshielded in the
courtroom?  Is the appropriate standard the incidence of false accusations as
compared to false recantations?110  How many false recantations would offset a
false accusation?111
In Coy, the Court conceded that false allegations are less likely with face-to-
face meetings:
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centu-
ries because there is much truth to it.  A witness “may feel quite differently when he
has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or
mistaking the facts.” . . .  It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person “to his
face” than “behind his back.”112
Even Craig recognized that “face-to-face confrontation enhances the accuracy
of fact-finding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an
innocent person.”113
Social science has only begun to answer questions about the reliability of
shielded testimony.  This nascent research has studied the performance of chil-
dren who witnessed an event and were asked to testify about that event in ei-
ther the presence or absence of the perpetrator, an experimental confederate.
tations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 888 (1988) (“The confrontation guarantee is a defendant-centered right
and cannot reasonably be read as a general assurance of trials based on reliable evidence.”).
109. 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1998).
110. Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse Trials, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1290-91
(1992) (discussing the dilemma of shielding to prevent false negatives—children’s incomplete and inef-
fective testimony and children’s recantations—at the risk of facilitating false positives—children’s inac-
curate and untruthful allegations).
111. The reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials is premised on the belief that it is better for
some guilty to go free than to convict the innocent.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).  Compare Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Cri-
tique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999) (arguing that false acquittals are a more serious problem than
false convictions given the realities of child sexual abuse cases), with Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D.
Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 33 (2000) (using Bayesian probability theory to demonstrate that a false positive is not equivalent
to a false negative and that even small probabilities that a child would make a false allegation of sexual
abuse may be highly significant).
112. 487 U.S. at 1019 (quoting Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 375-76 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
113. 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
MARSIL_FMT.DOC 12/05/01  11:26 AM
222 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 65: No. 1
For example, Paula Hill and Samuel Hill had seven- to nine-year-old chil-
dren watch a video of an unpleasant exchange between a father and daughter.114
Children were then questioned about the video either in a courtroom setting
with the father present or in a small room with the father absent.115  The children
who testified in the small room were able to provide more detailed and accurate
testimony than the children who testified in a courtroom facing the father.116
Additionally, the children in the protective condition were less likely to say “I
don’t know” or give no response than the children who testified in the court-
room setting in front of the father.117
In part, the Goodman study sought to determine whether testimony given
via closed-circuit television versus in open court would improve children’s accu-
racy.118  The researchers found that, in general, the modality of the child’s testi-
mony did not impact the accuracy of their free recall.119  One positive effect,
however, was found: specifically, that younger children, the five- to six-year-
olds, who testified in open court made more errors of omission than children of
the same age who testified via closed-circuit television.120
These studies provide some evidence that shielded children are more accu-
rate, detailed, and make fewer errors than children who are required to testify
in open court.  It is important to note that in the studies described above, chil-
dren were not testifying about a traumatic sexual abuse incident.  They were
testifying under conditions expected to be less stressful than if the child was tes-
tifying in a sexual abuse trial.  The studies may therefore actually under-predict
how shielding improves children’s accuracy.
One concern regarding the use of shielded testimony is that the child may
make more false statements.  The evidence that follows shows that this concern
may be unwarranted.  Holly Orcutt and her colleagues conducted a study (the
“Orcutt study”) in part to address children’s ability to lie when they testify in
open court versus via closed-circuit television.121  In this study, seventy children
ranging in age from seven to nine years old individually made a video with a
male confederate.122  The children participated in one of three conditions: guilty,
not guilty, or deception.123  During the making of the video, children in the guilty
condition placed stickers on exposed body parts—for example, arms, toes, or
belly button—while children in the not-guilty condition placed stickers on
114. Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Videotaping Children’s Testimony: An Empirical View, 85
MICH. L. REV. 809, 814 & n.19 (1987).
115. Id. at 814.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 815.
118. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 183.
119. Id. at 184.
120. Id. at 185.
121. See Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’ Abilities to
Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed-Circuit Trials, 25 LAW & HUM. BEH. 339, 339-72 (2001).
122. Id. at 343, 345.
123. Id. at 343.
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clothing and accessories—for example, shirt sleeves, shoes, or belt.124  In the de-
ception condition, children made the same video as children in the not-guilty
condition, but were coached to lie in their testimony and say they had placed
stickers on exposed body parts, as occurred in the guilty condition.125  This study
is the first to employ this design while randomly assigning children to testify in
either open court or via closed-circuit television.  Community members were
paid to act as mock jurors for the simulated trials.126
Results showed that children provided equally incriminating testimony in
the guilty and deception conditions and that children in both these conditions
provided significantly more incriminating testimony than children in the not-
guilty condition.127  In general, children who were asked to lie in the deception
condition implicated the defendant about as much as the children in the guilty
condition.128  Notably, children in the deception condition, regardless of whether
they testified in open court or via closed-circuit television, did not differ in their
implication of the defendant.129  Therefore, children’s lying was not facilitated by
the use of protective measures.130
In sum, the current research on whether shielding procedures facilitate lying
indicates that children do not lie better when they are protected from a face-to-
face confrontation with the alleged defendant.  Given that the Orcutt study is
the only study to address this issue, additional research is needed to replicate
and extend its findings.  In addition, conscience had no role to play for the chil-
dren in the deception condition in the Orcutt study.  Presumably, it is harder for
a person to falsely accuse the defendant in a confrontational setting, because
the defendant’s presence triggers the accuser’s conscience.  Children in the de-
ception condition of the Orcutt study were told that it was a “pretend trial.”131
They were told to think of themselves as actors.132  They also knew that the “de-
fendant” would not be in trouble because of anything they said.133  These prob-
lems are understandable given the ethical constraints on this sort of study.
Nevertheless, if shielding did not facilitate their false implication of the defen-
dant, it could be because children in the deception condition were comfortable
falsely implicating the defendant without being shielded.
F. Ability of Jurors to Detect Deception
In Coy v. Iowa, the Court suggested that jurors are better able to detect de-
ception when witnesses testify unshielded in the courtroom: “It is always more
124. Id. at 347.
125. Id. at 351.
126. Id. at 345.
127. Id. at 356.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 351.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’  In the
former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly.”134  A
criminal defendant has a legitimate interest in exposing false allegations.  If ju-
rors are better at detecting deception when the witness testifies unshielded in
the courtroom, defendants will prefer children’s courtroom testimony to chil-
dren’s shielded testimony.  The fact of the matter is that jurors are not particu-
larly adept at detecting deception in either case.135
In the Goodman study, mock jurors assessed the veracity of children’s tes-
timony in a shielded condition—via closed-circuit television—or in an open
court condition.136  Using a correlational analysis, the researchers examined the
relationship between children’s overall accuracy and mock jurors’ perceptions
of the child’s accuracy.137  They found that mock jurors were best at determining
accuracy when the six-year-olds testified in open court and when eight-year-
olds testified via closed-circuit television.138  Overall, mock jurors were not im-
paired in discerning accuracy due to the use of protective measures.139  The
mock jurors, however, were not very good at determining whether a statement
was actually correct under either condition.140
In the Orcutt study, mock jurors’ ability to evaluate the honesty of chil-
dren’s testimony in the closed-circuit television condition and the open court
condition was examined.141  The results showed that mock jurors’ ability to as-
sess deception was not impaired by the use of closed-circuit television.142  That
is, the mock jurors’ verdicts did not differ with regard to whether the child testi-
fied in open court or via closed-circuit television.143  Thus, the concern that pro-
tective measures may hinder a juror’s ability to detect deception may be un-
founded.144
III
CHILDREN’S HEARSAY
The article thus far has focused on issues relating to protecting a child when
he or she testifies in court.  It will now examine issues relating to the use of
children’s hearsay in court.
134. 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
135. See Paul Ekman, Why Lies Fail and What Behaviors Betray a Lie, in CREDIBILITY
ASSESSMENT 71 (John C. Yuille ed., 1989) (finding that there are behavioral cues that indicate decep-
tion, but people rarely use these cues).
136. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 192.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 193.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Orcutt et al., supra note 121, at 357.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 366.
144. Id.
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Most lay people understand hearsay to be one person’s report about what
another person has said.  As a legal matter, however, hearsay is a statement
originally made out of court and later offered in court to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.145  The person who makes the out-of-court statement is the
hearsay declarant.146  The person who recounts in court the hearsay declarant’s
out-of-court statement is the hearsay witness.  Usually, but not always, the hear-
say witness is not the same person as the hearsay declarant.
Hearsay is generally not admissible.147  A witness ordinarily testifies in court
only about past events perceived personally by that witness and does not repeat
in court what someone else has said about an event.  Hearsay that falls within
an exception to the hearsay rule is admissible as an evidentiary matter.148  Chil-
dren’s hearsay may be admissible pursuant to well-established exceptions to the
hearsay rule, like the excited utterance exception,149 and the exception for
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.150  Children’s
hearsay may also be admissible pursuant to special child hearsay statutes.151
Some hearsay that is admissible as an evidentiary matter may be inadmissi-
ble as a constitutional matter.152  When hearsay, including children’s hearsay,153
145. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
146. FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
147. FED. R. EVID. 802.
148. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing exceptions for which the availability of the declarant is immate-
rial for admissibility); FED. R. EVID. 804 (requiring the unavailability of the declarant for admissibil-
ity); FED. R. EVID. 807 (including a residual exception).
149. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (creating an exception for a “statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condi-
tion”).  In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349, 350 & n.1 (1992), for instance, statements made by a child
sexual assault victim to her mother thirty minutes after her assault and while the child appeared
“scared” and a “little hyper” were admitted under the Illinois spontaneous declaration exception, the
state equivalent of the federal excited utterance exception.  Id.
150. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4).  In White, for instance, statements made by a four-year-old child
sexual assault victim to an emergency room nurse and doctor were admitted under the Illinois “medical
examination” exception.  502 U.S. at 350-51.  For a discussion of this hearsay exception in the context
of child sexual abuse cases, see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for
the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989) (untangling the rationales
supporting the medical examination exception), and Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disinte-
gration of the Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2002) (updating his earlier analysis).
151. See statutes cited supra note 4.  Statutes vary, but the most common formulation requires the
child’s testimony or a showing of the child’s unavailability and corroboration.  See Jean Montoya, Child
Hearsay Statutes: At Once Over-Inclusive and Under-Inclusive, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 304, 305-
06 & n.10 (1999) (discussing the child hearsay statutes).
152. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) (observing that hearsay and Confrontation
Clause analyses are distinct).
153. Citing Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, the defendant-petitioner in White argued that chil-
dren’s hearsay should be admitted only upon a showing of necessity.  White, 502 U.S. at 357-58.  The
Court in White, however, distinguished Coy and Craig as cases addressing Confrontation Clause re-
quirements when shielding procedures are used and not when hearsay is offered.  Id. at 358.  It may,
however, be appropriate to treat children’s hearsay, even children’s hearsay technically falling within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, differently than adult hearsay.  See Montoya, supra note 5, at 977-86
(arguing that the child witness context raises distinct issues when assessing the reliability of hearsay).
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falls within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule,154 the Confrontation
Clause poses no obstacle to admissibility; the prosecution need not first produce
the declarant or demonstrate the declarant’s unavailability.155  The rationale for
this rule is that the context of these out-of-court statements imbues the state-
ments with substantial guarantees of trustworthiness that cannot be recaptured
by later in-court testimony.156  In White v. Illinois, the United States Supreme
Court explained the significance of a statement’s context:
A statement that has been offered in a moment of excitement—without the opportu-
nity to reflect on the consequences of one’s exclamation—may justifiably carry more
weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the
courtroom.  Similarly, a statement made in the course of procuring medical services,
where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreat-
ment, carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier of fact may not think repli-
cated by courtroom testimony.157
When out-of-court statements do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception, the statements are presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Con-
frontation Clause purposes.158  This presumption, however, is rebuttable if the
prosecution can demonstrate the hearsay’s trustworthiness.159  The hearsay
statement must be “at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception,” and “similarly [must] be so trustworthy that adver-
sarial testing would add little to its reliability.”160  The court making the trust-
worthiness determination, however, considers only the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief.161  It is not enough that evidence of unreliability is absent; af-
firmative evidence of reliability must be present.162  The fact that other evidence
corroborates the hearsay statement is irrelevant to the inquiry.163  Whether the
declarant’s production or unavailability is required to admit hearsay not falling
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception may be an open question.164
154. The excited utterance exception and the exception for statements made for purposes of medi-
cal diagnosis or treatment are among the firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.  White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8
(1992).
155. Id. at 348-49.
156. Id. at 355-56.
157. Id. at 356.
158. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (regarding Idaho’s residual hearsay exception).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 821.
161. Id. at 819.
162. Id. at 821.
163. Id. at 822-24.  This approach to the trustworthiness determination was sharply criticized by the
Wright dissenters.  Id. at 827-35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Percep-
tions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 390-91, 408, 415 (1999)
(concluding from an empirical study that jurors consider the existence of corroborating evidence in as-
sessing the trustworthiness of children’s hearsay).
164. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court set forth “a general approach” for determining when hearsay
statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause.  448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).  Under this approach, “the prosecution must either produce,
or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defen-
dant.”  Id.  In White v. Illinois, the Court limited Roberts to its facts, asserting that “unavailability
analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court
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A child hearsay statute providing for the admissibility of otherwise inadmis-
sible children’s hearsay is a relatively recent legislative experiment and not a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.165  Thus, these statutes generally re-
quire the child to testify or be unavailable, in addition to a showing that the
hearsay statement is reliable.166
As with the use of shielding procedures when children are witnesses, the
admissibility of children’s hearsay is based on a host of assumptions.  Some of
these assumptions are explored below in light of the available social science
evidence.
A. Child Witness Protection
Receiving children’s out-of-court hearsay statements in lieu of live testi-
mony protects children from confrontational stress.  Indeed, if the child is not
called as a witness, the child is not even subjected to cross-examination, as child
witnesses are when shielding procedures are used.  In theory, children’s hearsay
can be offered in lieu of children’s testimony: With firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tions, the prosecutor is not obligated to produce the child witness.  Moreover,
with most child hearsay statutes, the prosecutor also need not produce the child
witness if he or she can demonstrate the child’s unavailability.
Despite this theoretical possibility of receiving children’s hearsay in lieu of
children’s live testimony, the reality in United States criminal courts is different.
The admissibility of children’s hearsay does not protect child witnesses from
confrontational stress because children’s hearsay is typically admitted in addi-
tion to, rather than in lieu of, their courtroom testimony.167  The recitation of
facts in appellate cases reviewing the admission of children’s hearsay often indi-
cates that the child victim testified.168  Empirical research regarding child sexual
statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354
(1992).  White, however, dealt with hearsay falling within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.  See supra
note 154 and accompanying text.  White, like Roberts, may ultimately be limited to its facts.  Predating
White, the Court addressed hearsay not falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception in Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).  Applying the Roberts approach, the Court in Wright assumed that the
child declarant was unavailable within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 816.
165. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (observing that “[a]dmission under a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability because of the weight accorded longstanding
judicial and legislative experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court
statements”).  For a brief history of the child hearsay statutes, see Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We
Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay
Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 237-38 (1995).
166. See statutes cited supra note 4.
167. See Montoya, supra note 151, at 309-16 (discussing the overinclusiveness of child hearsay stat-
utes).
168. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 154 (1995) (indicating that the child testified, and the
Government produced six witnesses who testified, to a total of seven statements made by the child de-
scribing the alleged sexual assaults); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 805-06 (Ariz. 1987) (noting that
one of two child victims testified, and out-of-court statements were introduced through a physician, a
psychologist, and two babysitters); State v. Tucker, 798 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (noting
that a child testified, and the child’s out-of-court statements were introduced through a police officer,
detective, and social worker); Duvall v. State, 852 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the
victim testified, and that the state introduced the child’s hearsay statements through various witnesses
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abuse prosecutions also indicates that children’s hearsay is admitted in addition
to the child’s courtroom testimony.169
A study by John E.B. Myers and his colleagues (the “Myers study”) in-
volved the collection of data from forty-two jury trials in criminal courts in Sac-
ramento, California, and Phoenix, Arizona.170  In each of the trials, at least one
child testified live in court and at least one adult reported child hearsay.171  The
production of these child witnesses in court means that the child witnesses
physically confronted the defendant, which is a documented source of emo-
tional trauma for child witnesses.
The Myers study does not indicate whether the children’s hearsay was ad-
mitted pursuant to firmly rooted hearsay exceptions or special child hearsay
statutes.  Nor does the study indicate whether prosecutors attempted but failed
to convince the trial court of the child’s unavailability to proceed under a spe-
cial child hearsay statute.  If prosecutors produce the child witness in addition
to offering the child’s hearsay pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or
offer hearsay evidence pursuant to special child hearsay statutes and call the
child witness without attempting to demonstrate the child’s unavailability, it
could indicate the prosecutor’s belief that the child does not require protection
from confrontation.172  It could also indicate a belief that they need the child’s
such as a SCAN worker, a police officer, a doctor and his nurse, a babysitter, and the babysitter’s
daughter); People v. Brodit, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154, 163 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the child and six
hearsay witnesses testified including the child’s grandmother, her aunt, a social worker, a police detec-
tive, a nurse practitioner, and the child’s therapist); People v. Salas, 902 P.2d 398, 400 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994) (noting that the jury heard the child’s description of the assault a total of four times when the
child testified, two adult prosecution witnesses recounted the child’s hearsay statements, and a police
investigator played a recorded interview with the child); State v. Marshall, 694 A.2d 816, 818 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1997) (noting that the trial court admitted into evidence the testimony of six constancy-of-
accusation witnesses, in addition to the victim’s videotaped testimony and two videotaped interviews),
cert. granted in part, 697 A.2d 361 (Conn. 1997); Jenkins v. State, 508 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that the child and seven hearsay witnesses testified including the child’s mother, great-
grandmother, a criminal investigator, a social worker, a psychologist, a nurse, and a physician); People
v. Byron, 645 N.E.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting that the victim testified, and that the vic-
tim’s mother, sister, and two police officers testified, pursuant to the child hearsay statute); State v. Sil-
vey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 664-65, 672 (Mo. 1995) (noting that the child testified, and that the child’s out-of-
court statements were recounted by her mother, her aunt, and a social worker); State v. Gollaher, 905
S.W.2d 542, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the child victim testified, and that the child’s out-of-
court statements were recounted by four witnesses, namely, the doctor who examined the child, the
child’s mother, the child’s aunt, and an investigating officer); State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 874, 877 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the child testified, and that the child’s out-of-court statements were re-
counted by four witnesses, namely, a pediatrician, two case workers, and his foster mother), overruled
in part by State v. Redman, 916 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1996); State v. Tringl, 848 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993) (noting that the victim testified, and her out-of-court statements were recounted by four wit-
nesses, namely, the child’s stepmother, two detectives, and a doctor); Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220, 229,
254 (Nev. 1993) (noting that the child testified, and that her out-of-court statements were recounted by
five adult witnesses including her mother, two psychologists, a pediatrician, and a detective); State v.
Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the child victim testified, and that the child’s
father and the defendant’s step-granddaughter recounted the child’s hearsay statements).
169. See Myers et al., supra note 163, at 416.
170. Id. at 394, 396.
171. Id. at 397.
172. Preparing the child witness to testify and giving child witnesses tours of the courtroom are
strategies frequently used by prosecutors.  See generally Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child
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live testimony to prevail and are willing to sacrifice child protection to that
end.173
B. Defendant Prejudice
A survey of state trial court judges asked about their perceptions of the fair-
ness of child witness innovations.  The judges expressed that certain innova-
tions, such as allowing hearsay evidence, were unfair.174  Nevertheless, they ad-
mitted such hearsay evidence in their own courts.175
Children’s hearsay may be unfairly overused by prosecutors.  A review of
the appellate cases discussing the admission of hearsay in child abuse prosecu-
tions indicates that triers of fact are hearing from multiple hearsay witnesses.176
The Myers study provides additional evidence that prosecutors call multiple
hearsay witnesses in child abuse cases.  Data from forty-two trials indicated the
following: One adult hearsay witness testified in one trial; two adult hearsay
witnesses testified in twenty-one trials; three adult hearsay witnesses testified in
thirteen trials; four adult hearsay witnesses testified in six trials; and five adult
hearsay witnesses testified in one trial.177
At some point, enough is enough from a due process perspective.  In Felix v.
State, the Nevada Supreme Court declared that “the unlimited admission of re-
petitive hearsay testimony can jeopardize the fundamental fairness of the entire
trial.”178  Indeed, the Felix court waxed philosophical when it asserted:
Witnesses: A National Survey, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 255 (1999) (reporting the results of a na-
tionwide survey of prosecutors).  Adequate preparation of the child witness may ameliorate the child
witness’s fear of the confrontational setting.  Louise Dezwirek-Sas, Empowering Child Witnesses for
Sexual Abuse Prosecution, in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 181, 196-97 (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds.,
1992); Stephen Moston, Social Support and Children’s Eyewitness Testimony, in CHILDREN AS
WITNESSES 33, 43 (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds., 1992); Kathryn Sisterman Keeney et al., The Court
Prep Group: A Vital Part of the Court Process, in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 201, 207-08 (Helen Dent &
Rhona Flin eds., 1992).
173. See Myers et al., supra note 163, at 411 (surmising that “prosecutors are reluctant to take child
sexual abuse cases to trial unless the victim is available to testify”).
174. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Protecting Child Witnesses: Judicial Efforts to Minimize Trauma
and Reduce Evidentiary Barriers, 11 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 71, 77 (1996) (reporting that the use of
hearsay exceptions was the innovation “most likely to be considered unfair” by surveyed judges).
175. Id. at 75 (reporting that seventy-two percent of surveyed judges admitted children’s out-of-
court statements pursuant to hearsay exceptions).
176. See cases cited supra note 168.
177. See Myers et al., supra note 163, at 397.
178. 849 P.2d 220, 253 (Nev. 1993).  A few other courts have addressed the problem of repetitive
hearsay statements in child abuse cases.  In Pardo v. State, for instance, the Florida Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the admission of repetitive hearsay statements pursuant to the child hearsay statute is
problematic and subject to the balancing test in Florida’s equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
596 So. 2d 665, 667-68 (Fla. 1992).  In that case, the state had filed notices of intent to rely on hearsay
statements made by the child victim to nine separate individuals.  Id. at 666.  The trial court had found
only three of the hearsay statements to be sufficiently reliable.  Id.  Similarly, in State v. D.G., the New
Jersey Supreme Court reminded the state trial courts that repetitive child hearsay statements are sub-
ject to exclusion pursuant to New Jersey’s equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 723 A.2d 588,
595-96 (N.J. 1999).  In that case, the child’s credibility was at issue: The child had recanted, had made
identical allegations against someone other than the defendant, and the prosecutor was forced to im-
peach her on the stand.  Id. at 595.  The court observed that the corroborative statements “may well
have tipped the scale.”  Id.
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The repetition of multiple child hearsay accusations through several adult witnesses
presents the very real possibility of placing the person accused of [child sexual abuse]
at an unfair disadvantage.  Although some may opine that this is what such an of-
fender deserves, we must remember that a trial is a procedure to determine whether
the accused is the offender and not simply a process to confirm allegations made by
the State.  No person, neither the alleged victim nor the accused, should be placed at a
substantial disadvantage in a criminal trial by the rules of procedure and evidence.
We believe that the appellants were disadvantaged in this case by the unbridled intro-
duction into evidence of repetitive hearsay allegations . . . when much of this evidence
was merely cumulative and unnecessary.179
In Felix, the child testified in court.  Her out-of-court statements were then
recounted by five adult hearsay witnesses: her mother, two psychologists, a pe-
diatrician, and a detective.180  The court concluded that hearsay allegations
should be restricted “once the child’s [sexual abuse] accusations have been
fairly presented . . . and any challenges to the victim’s credibility are fairly
met.”181  The court held that the limitation on the admission of multiple hearsay
was reasonable because it amounted to the admission of unnecessary prior con-
sistent statements,182 it amounted to vouching for the child victim’s credibility,
and it was more prejudicial than probative.183
A few child hearsay statutes limit the number of hearsay statements that are
admissible.  The Michigan statute limits the proponent of children’s hearsay to
the child declarant’s first statement.184  The Texas statute similarly admits only
the child’s statements “to the first person, 18 years of age or older.”185  The Mas-
sachusetts statute may indirectly prevent the admission of multiple hearsay
statements through its requirement that the statement be “more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts.”186  Presumably, a repetitive hearsay
statement would not be more probative.
Social scientists have begun to explore the effects of using hearsay testi-
mony, combining the child victim’s live testimony with hearsay testimony, and
admitting the testimony of multiple hearsay witnesses.  These studies represent
a first step toward understanding how hearsay testimony can impact a trial.
For example, a study by David Ross, Rod Lindsay, and Dorothy Marsil ex-
amined the impact of hearsay testimony on conviction rates in child sexual
179. Felix, 849 P.2d at 254-55.
180. Id. at 229, 254.
181. Id. at 253.
182. As a matter of federal evidence law, prior consistent statements are inadmissible unless offered
to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.  FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
The statements are not admissible to bolster the declarant’s trial testimony.  Tome v. United States, 513
U.S. 150, 157-58 (1995).
183. Felix, 849 P.2d at 253.
184. MICH. R. EVID. 803A.
185. TEX. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 38.072((2)(a)(2)) (West Supp. 2001).
186. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 81(a) (West 2000).
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abuse cases.187  In Experiment 1, mock jurors watched a realistic videotape of a
trial in a courtroom setting.188  Half of the mock jurors saw the child victim tes-
tify in open court while the other half saw the child’s mother, the hearsay wit-
ness, testify on behalf of the child victim.189  In this experiment, the defendant
was convicted significantly more often when the child testified instead of the
hearsay witness.190  In Experiment 2, mock jurors read a trial summary of a child
sexual abuse case.191  The type of testimony varied and was either given by the
child or a hearsay witness.192  The type of hearsay witness was also varied, with
the witness taking the role of the child’s mother, doctor, teacher, or neighbor.193
Results showed that each hearsay condition, except the neighbor, produced
more guilty verdicts than when the child testified.194
Although discrepant results in conviction rates were found between Ex-
periment 1 and Experiment 2, this might be explained by the different stimulus
or the relationship between the victim and the hearsay witness.195  First, Experi-
ment 1 used a highly realistic videotape of a trial versus a trial summary.196  Sec-
ond, in Experiment 1, the hearsay witness was the child’s mother, the defendant
was the child’s father, and the parents were divorced.197  By contrast, in Experi-
ment 2, the defendant was the child’s neighbor.198  Presumably, the mother in
Experiment 1 may have a motive to lie against the father, whereas in Experi-
ment 2, there is a less clear motive for the hearsay witness to lie.
Research by Anne Tubb and colleagues analyzed the impact of hearsay tes-
timony on conviction rates using a written child sexual abuse trial summary.199
Mock jurors were randomly assigned to one of three testimony conditions in
which key testimony was provided.200  In the first condition, the child testified; in
the second, a police officer testified as a hearsay witness in lieu of the child; the
third condition varied from the second condition only in that the police officer
also gave his positive opinion of the child’s credibility.201  The results showed
that there was no difference in the verdict for any of these conditions.202  Thus,
187. David F. Ross et al., The Impact of Hearsay Testimony on Conviction Rates in Trials of Child
Sexual Abuse: Toward Balancing the Rights of Defendants and Child Witnesses, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 439, 441 (1999).
188. Id. at 445.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 447.
191. Id. at 449.
192. Id. at 450.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 450-51.
195. Id. at 452.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 445.
198. Id. at 450.
199. V. Anne Tubb et al., Effects of Suggestive Interviewing and Indirect Evidence on Child Credi-
bility in a Sexual Abuse Case, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1114 (1999).
200. Id. at 1115.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1117.
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mock jurors were neither more nor less likely to convict when the child testified
directly than when the hearsay witness testified, regardless of the credibility
opinion.203
A study by Golding and colleagues (the “Golding study”) examined the use
of hearsay in a child sexual assault trial where mock jurors read a trial summary
and then completed questionnaires.204  In Experiment 1, the victim alleged that
her uncle had fondled her.205  The primary variable in this experiment was the
condition under which the testimony was presented.206  In the first condition, the
critical testimony was given by the child victim who was either six or fourteen
years old.207  In the second condition, the critical testimony was given by the
hearsay witness, either the child’s mother or teacher.208  In the third condition,
both the victim and the hearsay witness testified.209  In the fourth condition, no
critical testimony was given; the only witness to testify for the prosecution was a
cousin who said that the child had spent the night at the uncle’s house with
her.210  The Golding study was the first to use a trial summary stimulus to ex-
amine the use of hearsay in a child sexual assault trial and the first to combine
the testimony given by a child victim with testimony given by a hearsay witness.
No significant differences in guilty verdicts were found among the following
situations: when the child testified, when the child and hearsay witness testified,
or when the hearsay witness testified.  In fact, guilty verdicts were equal in the
child victim and the hearsay witness situations.211  The only significant differ-
ences occurred when the cousin testified—there were significantly fewer guilty
verdicts than in the other conditions tested.212  The age of the victim did not in-
fluence the verdict.213
Experiment 2 used a similar method but included a four-year-old victim and
varied the sex of the hearsay witness, in this case a teacher.214  In this experi-
ment, the testimony conditions were the same as in Experiment 1, except that
the condition in which both the victim and the hearsay witness testified was ex-
cluded.215  Results showed that, in general, there was no difference among testi-
mony conditions with regard to guilty verdicts except, again, there were signifi-
cantly less guilty verdicts for the condition in which only the cousin testified.216
203. Id.
204. Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Believability of Hearsay Testimony in a Child Sexual Assault
Trial, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299, 304 (1997).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 308.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 309.
215. Id. at 310.
216. Id. at 316.
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In this experiment, however, the age of the victim had a small impact on
guilty verdicts when the victim was four years old and a hearsay witness testi-
fied.217  When the victim was four years old, ninety-five percent of the verdicts in
the hearsay condition were guilty verdicts, compared to eighty-five percent
when the victim was six years old, and seventy-six percent when the victim was
fourteen years old.218  Guilty verdicts did not differ by the victim’s age when the
child testified—about eighty-five percent of the verdicts were returned guilty.219
Interestingly, a hearsay witness may actually help get a conviction when the
child victim is very young and unwilling or unable to testify.220
Finally, a second study by Golding and colleagues examined the effect of
multiple hearsay witnesses on verdicts in a child sexual assault case.221  There
were three conditions varying the way in which the critical testimony for the
prosecution was presented: (1) by the child victim and expert witness; (2) by a
hearsay witness—the child’s sister—and expert witness; or (3) only by the ex-
pert witness.222  The results show that when multiple hearsay witnesses, in this
case the victim’s sister and an expert clinical psychologist, testified in lieu of the
victim, there were significantly more convictions than when the critical testi-
mony was given by the victim or by the expert alone.223
Taken together, these studies report dramatically conflicting results.  One
study reports higher conviction rates when the child versus a hearsay witness
testifies;224 others report no difference.225  Another study reports higher convic-
tion rates when hearsay witnesses rather than the child witness testify.226  Ross
and his colleagues posed a credibility inflation/deflation model to explain these
conflicting results.227  The underlying idea of the model is that the hearsay wit-
ness’s perceived credibility is critical to the impact that his or her testimony will
have on the trial.228  For example, in the Ross study described above, either the
child testified or the child’s mother testified on her behalf.229  The mother was
also involved in a heated divorce with the child’s father who was the defendant
in the child sexual abuse case.230  Thus, in this situation the mother had a strong
vested interest in the case, and jurors were reluctant to believe her testimony.231
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 316-17.
221. Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Effect of Hearsay Witness Age in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 420, 424 (1999).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 427.
224. See Ross et al., supra note 187, at 447.
225. See Golding et al., supra note 204, at 308; Tubb et al., supra note 199, at 1117.
226. See Ross et al., supra note 187, at 450.
227. Id. at 453.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 445.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 447.
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Jurors were more likely to believe the child testifying on her own behalf than
the mother testifying for her.232  Therefore, the critical issue in interpreting these
studies involves the effect of the context, and whether it increases or decreases
the perceived credibility of the hearsay witness.
On a separate note, given the prevalence of admitting the testimony of mul-
tiple hearsay witnesses in child sexual abuse trials, more information is needed
on the impact of such evidence.  The initial research by Golding is striking and
suggests that the admission of multiple hearsay witnesses may be unfair to de-
fendants.233  Therefore, this important issue should be further addressed by so-
cial scientists through empirical research.
C. Reliability of Children’s Hearsay Evidence
The fundamental premise of cases upholding the admission of hearsay evi-
dence in the face of the Confrontation Clause is that the hearsay evidence is re-
liable, and statement context is considered critical to hearsay’s reliability.234  In
Idaho v. Wright, where children’s hearsay did not fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, the United States Supreme Court provided a nonexclusive
list of factors relevant to the requisite reliability determination: the child’s spon-
taneity and consistent repetition of the allegations, the child’s mental state
when the allegations are made, the child’s use of terminology unexpected of a
child of similar age, and the child’s lack of motive to fabricate.235  The Court also
emphasized the suggestive manner in which the child may have been inter-
viewed, and clarified that spontaneity can be an inaccurate indicator of trust-
worthiness when evidence exists of prior interrogation, prompting, or manipula-
tion by adults.236  Although the Court emphasized the importance of the manner
in which a child witness is interviewed,237 the Court declined to require the tap-
ing of child witness interviews as a prerequisite to admissibility under the Con-
232. Id.
233. See Golding et al., supra note 221, at 427.
234. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
235. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990).  Various child hearsay statutes include their own
nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the reliability inquiry.  E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-37 (1995) (list-
ing the following factors: (1) the child’s personal knowledge of the event; (2) the age and maturity of
the child; (3) certainty that the statement was made, including the credibility of the person testifying
about the statement; (4) any apparent motive the child may have to falsify or distort the event, includ-
ing bias, corruption, or coercion; (5) the timing of the child’s statement; (6) whether more than one per-
son heard the statement; (7) whether the child was suffering from pain or distress when making the
statement; (8) the nature and duration of any alleged abuse; (9) whether the child’s young age makes it
unlikely that the child fabricated a statement that represents a graphic, detailed account beyond the
child’s knowledge and experience; (10) whether the statement has a “ring of verity,” has an internal
consistency or coherence, and uses terminology appropriate to the child’s age; (11) whether the state-
ment is spontaneous or directly responsive to questions; (12) whether the statement is suggestive due to
improperly leading questions; (13) whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant’s opportu-
nity to commit the act complained of in the child’s statement).
236. Wright, 497 U.S. at 826-27.
237. The doctor who interviewed the child in Wright asked leading questions and questioned the
child with a preconceived idea of what occurred.  Id. at 818.
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frontation Clause.238  Nevertheless, the failure to record these interviews leaves
the trial court at the mercy of the interviewer to reconstruct the manner in
which the interview was conducted.
Social science has much to tell us about how child witnesses should be inter-
viewed and whether interviewers accurately remember what children have told
them and what questions they asked the children during the interview.  The
bulk of this research supports the conclusion that there is a deterioration in the
quality of some, but not all, aspects of memory for the event experienced by the
child as it passes down the hearsay chain from the child to the hearsay witness,
and subsequently from the hearsay witness to the jury.  Another issue involves
the ability of the hearsay witness, often a professional who has interviewed the
child, to recall accurately the nature of the interview and the specific questions
asked.  This issue has been examined in several large-scale studies.
For example, Bruck and her colleagues had young children play with a con-
federate, and several days later the mothers interviewed their children about
the event.239  Half of the mothers were warned that the study involved examin-
ing memory, and the other half were not.240  Three days after interviewing their
children, the mothers were questioned regarding their recall for what the child
experienced at the preschool and aspects of the interview that they conducted
with their children.241
The results indicated that, while the mothers could recall approximately
sixty-six percent of the primary events the child experienced, they had consid-
erable difficulty with other aspects.242  For example, mothers only recalled ap-
proximately thirty-five percent of the details that their children had given them,
and they had serious difficulty reporting many of the specifics of the interview.
Their memory was particularly lacking with respect to what statements were
spontaneous or prompted and whether specific utterances were spoken by the
child or the mother.243  Finally, the warning provided to the mothers had no im-
pact on their memory.244
The finding that hearsay witness memory may be problematic with mothers
can be generalized to professional interviewers as well.  Warren and her col-
leagues had preschool children interviewed by professional interviewers con-
cerning staged events that occurred in their preschool.245  After the child inter-
view, the professional interviewers were questioned by an experimenter about
238. Id. at 818-19.  For a discussion about mandatory videotaping of child witness interviews, see
Lucy S. McGough, Good Enough for Government Work: The Constitutional Duty to Preserve Forensic
Interviews of Child Victims, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2002) (advocating videotaping).
239. Maggie Bruck et al., The Accuracy of Mothers’ Memories of Conversations with Their Pre-
school Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 89, 93 (1999).
240. Id. at 94.
241. Id. at 96.
242. Id. at 99.
243. Id. at 99-100.
244. Id. at 96 tbl. 1.
245. Amye R. Warren & Cara E. Woodall, The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do In-
terviewers Recall Their Interviews with Children?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 355, 359 (1999).
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their interview with the child.246  Among other things, the professionals were
asked to recall the major events the child experienced, the specific questions
asked during the interview, and the child’s exact responses.247  The professionals
could recall the majority, eighty percent, of the major event activities, but they
were very poor at recalling the characteristics of the interview, such as the num-
ber and content of the specific questions asked.248
Michael Lamb and his colleagues also studied the accuracy of professional
interviewers of children.249  In their study, the researchers examined Israeli
youth investigators’ interviews with alleged child sexual abuse victims by com-
paring their “verbatim” written notes to an audio recording of the same inter-
view.250  First, the results showed that interviewers recorded significantly fewer
details than the child actually provided in the audiotaped interview.251  Specifi-
cally, interviewers failed to report about twenty-five percent of the relevant de-
tails and about eighteen percent of the central details given by the child.252  The
interviewers, however, almost never reported incorrect or false information
(also known as “errors of commission”).253
Second, the interviewers were not very good at recalling what they had said
during the interview.254  That is, they failed to record over half of the utterances
they made to the child.255  In addition, the interviewers failed to record accu-
rately when their utterances were meant to elicit specific information from the
child rather than open-ended questions.256  In fact, they only recorded correctly
about forty-four percent of their more focused questions.257  Thus, the inter-
viewers reported information that frequently did not accurately represent the
interview with the child and did not report some suggestive questioning in-
cluded in the interview.258  These reports include the type of information that
could be presented in court and could impair a jury’s evaluation of the child’s
account as reported by the hearsay witness.
Finally, in a study by Maithilee Pathak and William Thompson, the re-
searchers examined the accuracy of an adult hearsay witness reporting an ob-
served interview with a child and then how mock jurors evaluated that testi-
246. Id. at 360.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 363.
249. See generally Michael E. Lamb et al., Accuracy of Investigators’ Verbatim Notes of Their Foren-
sic Interviews with Alleged Child Abuse Victims, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 699 (2000).
250. Id. at 699-700.
251. Id. at 703.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 704.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 705.
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mony.259  During the experiment, children individually watched a janitor clean or
play with toys and after a one-hour delay were interviewed in one of two condi-
tions: neutral or suggestive.260  Each child was videotaped during the interview.261
Notably, the children in the neutral condition accurately reported the janitor’s
actions, but the children in the suggestive condition were significantly influ-
enced by the questioning and inaccurately reported the janitor’s actions.262
Later, adult participants were shown a videotape of the child’s interview.263
Before watching the videotape, they were told that the child had either watched
the janitor clean the toys or that the janitor had attempted to engage the child
by playing with the toys.264  The participant, while being videotaped, reported
what was said by the child during a structured interview.265
The results showed that the adult participants could recognize when sugges-
tive questions were being used, and that they judged those questions to be more
influential on the child’s report than when children were questioned in the neu-
tral condition, regardless of the janitor’s actual actions or what the participant
was told the janitor did.266  Those participants were also asked to decide what
the janitor did based on the child’s report.267  Participants in the neutral condi-
tion were better able to determine the janitor’s actual actions than those in the
suggestive condition.268
In the second experiment, participants from universities and the community
watched a videotape of the structured interview with the first experiment’s
adult participants reporting what the child had said.269  Based on the hearsay
witness, the participants in the second experiment were asked to determine
whether the child’s interview had been suggestive and what the janitor’s actions
had been.270  The results showed that these participants were not able to deter-
mine the influence of suggestive questioning on the child’s report.271  The par-
ticipants were better able to discern the actions of the janitor, however, when
the child had been questioned in the neutral condition rather than the sugges-
tive condition.272  These results demonstrate that the type of interview, sugges-
tive or neutral, impacts the perception of the hearsay witness and the subse-
quent evaluation of the hearsay witness’s testimony by mock jurors.
259. Maithilee K. Pathak & William C. Thompson, From Child to Witness to Jury: Effects of Sugges-
tion on the Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 372, 374 (1999).
260. Id. at 376.
261. Id. at 375.
262. Id. at 377-78.
263. Id. at 376-77.
264. Id. at 377.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 378.
269. Id. at 379.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 381.
272. Id.
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The results of these studies should be of great concern to the courts.  These
studies demonstrate that adults, specifically mothers273 and professional inter-
viewers,274 are not very good at recalling the details of their conversations with
children, although the professional interviewers275 were more accurate than the
mothers.276  Of greatest concern is the finding that both groups did not recall
very well how they learned information—whether the child spontaneously told
them the information or whether it was the result of a specific question.277  In
addition, one of the studies showed that even when mock jurors realized that an
interview with a child was suggestive, they did not place sufficient weight on
how that type of questioning had impacted the child’s responses.278  Therefore,
given the current research findings, the testimony of hearsay witnesses should,
at the very least, be viewed with some skepticism.279
IV
CONCLUSION
Current normative legal standards for determining whether to shield testi-
fying children attempt to resolve the tension between a defendant’s constitu-
tional rights under the Confrontation Clause and the state’s interest in protect-
ing children from significant harm.  The Supreme Court, in Maryland v. Craig,280
treated those two interests as if they were poised in inevitable opposition.  One
critical issue will be whether social science research causes courts to view the in-
terests at stake in new ways, ultimately permitting the development of rules that
adequately protect defendants’ interests, while also better protecting children.281
Research conducted on shielded testimony makes several important points.
First, children undergo significant stress when they are required to testify in
court and in the presence of the defendant.282  More important, children’s stress
under these circumstances leads to incomplete and potentially inaccurate testi-
mony.283  Finally, some studies examining the reliability of shielded testimony
273. Bruck et al., supra note 239, at 99-100.
274. Lamb et al., supra note 249, at 703; Warren & Woodall, supra note 245, at 363.
275. Lamb et al., supra note 249, at 703; Warren & Woodall, supra note 245, at 363.
276. Bruck et al., supra note 239, at 99-100.
277. Id.; Lamb et al., supra note 249, at 704; Warren & Woodall, supra note 245, at 363.
278. Pathak & Thompson, supra note 259, at 381.
279. For additional discussion on this topic, see Ceci & Friedman, supra note 111, at 93-96.
280. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
281. The development of rules that strike the proper balance between an individual defendant’s
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him depends not only on social science research con-
clusions, but on the legal system’s determination that those conclusions should be used to alter the
framework currently used to analyze the problem.  Some members of the Court have cited social sci-
ence research in their analysis of the problem, see id. at 855, 857 (citing research by Gail Goodman),
but others have labeled the conclusion in Craig “antitextual,” and a “subordination of explicit constitu-
tional text to currently favored public policy.”  Id. at 861, 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating that
resolution of a defendant’s confrontation rights should not depend on policy developed from social sci-
ence research).
282. For more on this topic, see supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text.
283. Bussey et al., supra note 42, at 162; Peters, supra note 36, at 69.
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indicate that shielded testimony may not be inherently less reliable, if reliability
is defined in terms of accuracy and honesty.284
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys will want to pay attention to find-
ings that continue to support the notion that a child’s fear of a defendant can
have a significant impact on the child’s ability to testify in court.  For prosecu-
tors, this information corroborates and strengthens the basis for Craig, namely
the child’s fear of a particular defendant.  Given the need to show psychological
trauma to the individual child, prosecutors would do well not to rely on gener-
alized findings, but rather to provide expert testimony on the child’s mental
state and the impact of trial testimony on the particular child.285  Defense attor-
neys will be concerned that social science findings connecting children’s trauma
to the defendant’s presence might form the basis for leading questions, judicial
assumptions, or conclusory procedures to be used when a child is interviewed as
a predicate to shielding.286  They will also be concerned that the determinative
process itself not be used to create implications of heinous behavior by a par-
ticular defendant or to bestow any aura of special sympathy upon the alleged
victim.
One disturbing conclusion following from these studies may give pause to
those who consider shielding as the answer to the problem of children’s testi-
mony in court.  Social science research indicates that children’s shielded testi-
mony is not equivalent to children’s in-court testimony,287 but the difference may
not point in the expected direction.  Several studies show a possible negative
side to the shielding procedure.288  While shielding appears not to affect the ver-
284. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 184; Hill & Hill, supra note 114, at 814-15.
285. State court decisions vary on the persons permitted to serve as expert witnesses on trauma and
on the kind of testimony required.  Compare People v. Pesquera, 625 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
(using the testimony of experts as well as of the mothers of the children to determine that the children
should testify under shielding procedure), and George v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1994)
(holding that the victim should not have been permitted to give shielded testimony when the only evi-
dence of trauma was a social worker’s testimony that the victim would be more traumatized than most
children), with People v. Van Brocklin, 687 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding a social worker’s
testimony to be sufficient).  See also State v. Welch, 744 So. 2d 64 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (requiring expert
testimony by state statute), rev’d, 760 So. 2d 317 (La. 2000); Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. App.
1999) (noting that the teacher, parent, and grandparent claimed the child’s fear would prevent testi-
mony, and that the treating mental health therapist testified that she could not be sure the child could
testify).  Some states have held that no expert testimony is necessary in a Craig hearing, e.g., State v.
Bronson, 740 A.2d 458 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999), but prosecutors may still find it helpful.
286. See generally Montoya, supra note 19 (suggesting that the trial court should not rely on descrip-
tions offered by therapists or parents and should view the child).  It is not clear that courts have a well-
developed standard for “fearfulness.”  Some state statutes do give guidance to the trial court.  See
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2163a (West 2000) (listing factors for court consideration); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 967.04(7)(b) (West 1998) (detailing factors that the court must consider before shielding a child
witness).  But see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/106B-5(a)(2) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring only that
the judge find that the child suffers from emotional distress sufficient to meet the Craig test); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 915.38 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring only that the court find trauma that would meet
Craig); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626 (Michie 1995) (accord); HAW. R. EVID. 616 (accord).
287. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 563; see Swim et al., supra note 55, at 620.
288. Ross et al., supra note 55, at 563; see Swim et al., supra note 55, at 620.
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dict in most mock trial studies,289 shielding may have an important impact on the
jurors’ perception of the child witness.  Shielding a child witness from the rigors
of confrontation may permit jurors to discount the child more easily or to take
the child’s story less seriously.
Current research shows only that juror perceptions of shielded children
were not as favorable as the same juror perceptions of children who testified in
court.290  If this research is extended, it may prove important to child advocates
and prosecutors, as well as to defense attorneys.291  The legal system may need
to recognize that, in the long run, using protective measures such as shielding or
hearsay may not be as effective as more time-consuming and expensive meth-
ods like court preparation techniques and court schools, which have the poten-
tial to empower some child witnesses.292  Social science research can help by
making further and more detailed comparisons between different kinds of child
protective methods.
Hearsay evidence regarding children’s out-of-court statements presents
even more complex problems than shielded testimony.  Studies of current uses
of child-based exceptions to the hearsay rule indicate that these exceptions do
not always provide protection for children.293  Children’s hearsay often appears
to be admitted as additional testimony rather than in lieu of the particular
child’s testimony.  At least one study indicates that a conviction for child sexual
assault may be more likely when a hearsay witness testifies than when the child
victim testifies.294  Other studies show different results, with conviction rates in-
creasing with child testimony.295
Studies on the reliability of hearsay evidence also raise concerns.  One of the
primary defense concerns about allegations of sexual misconduct, particularly
when there is no physical corroborating evidence, is whether the child is re-
sponding to an adult’s suggestion of sexual wrongdoing by the alleged perpetra-
tor or is truly relaying his own experience.  Thus, the investigative technique
used to elicit the child’s response is important.  Defense attorneys will certainly
be concerned to know that mothers in recall studies had difficulty remembering
289. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 198; Ross et al., supra note 55, at 558; Swim et al., supra note
55, at 620.
290. Davies & Noon, supra note 100, at 24-25; see Tobey et al., supra note 97, at 232.
291. Defense attorneys may already know intuitively what this evidence tends to show: that jurors
seem to have less connection with or empathy for a child who is shielded.  Even with this knowledge,
others factors will necessarily affect a defendant’s assessment of the impact of shielding.  It may be one
thing to find the absence of bias and no increase in conviction rates in studies and quite another for the
individual attorney to forego the defendant’s rights under Craig.  Not only does the criminal defendant
have Confrontation Clause rights, but his right to effective assistance of counsel also has a constitu-
tional dimension that plays an important role in the selection of trial tactics.
292. See generally Louise Dezwirek-Sas, Sexually Abused Children as Witnesses: Progress and Pit-
falls, in CHILD ABUSE: NEW DIRECTIONS IN PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACROSS THE LIFESPAN
248-67 (David A. Wolfe & Robert Joseph McMahon eds., 1997); see also generally Dezwireck-Sas, su-
pra note 32.
293. Montoya, supra note 151, at 309-16.
294. Ross et al., supra note 187, at 450.
295. Id. at 447.
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if they asked a question that elicited a response from the child or if the child
gave the information spontaneously.296  These concerns may be heightened by
findings that jurors are sometimes unable to recognize the impact of suggestive
interviewing on the testimony of children.297  These concerns make the reliability
area important for future research.
Finally, all of this evidence demonstrates one central feature that should
concern both social scientists and lawyers: the tendency of adults to place the
most vulnerable child witnesses in a double bind.  The youngest, and therefore
the most vulnerable, witnesses in terms of anxiety may be the most likely to find
shelter under Craig.  Having been shielded, however, those children are viewed
less favorably by adults than older shielded children.  These children were also
viewed less favorably than children who testified in court.298  In the instances of
child hearsay, a very young child victim’s claim of abuse may be more credible
to a jury when it is relayed by a hearsay witness.299  Both social scientists and the
courts have a strong interest in protecting children from undue harm, but all
adults should recognize that this protection appears to carry a significant nega-
tive impact, not only for the children involved, but for the society that values
them.  At the present time, social science has helped to uncover this duality.
Once uncovered, it can be examined by both disciplines to produce policies that
fairly protect and empower children while also respecting the values inherent in
the constitutional rights of defendants.
296. Bruck et al., supra note 239, at 99-100.
297. Pathak & Thompson, supra note 259, at 381.
298. Goodman et al., supra note 55, at 196; Tobey et al., supra note 97, at 232.
299. Golding et al., supra note 204, at 316-17.
